Email forwarding and DMARC: SPF, DKIM and ARC
Updated 2026-11-16
Forwarding means that a message delivered to one address is sent on by that server to another address: an alumni or role address that relays to a personal mailbox, an alias, a mailing list. RFC 9989, the DMARC standard, is direct about the result: "the use of "p=reject" can be incompatible with and cause interoperability problems to indirect message flows such as "alumni forwarders", role-based email aliases, and mailing lists across the Internet" (section 7.4).
This guide is for the owner of a sending domain and for anyone who runs a forwarder. How the three protocols work on their own is in SPF explained, DKIM explained and DMARC explained.
Why forwarding breaks SPF
SPF checks the IP address that delivers the message against the record of the envelope sender's domain. After forwarding, the delivering address belongs to the forwarder. RFC 7960, which describes DMARC and indirect mail, sets out the two cases in section 2.2: "If the RFC5321.MailFrom is present and the forwarder maintains the original RFC5321.MailFrom, SPF validation will fail unless the forwarder is an authorized part of the originator's email sending infrastructure. If the forwarder replaces the RFC5321.MailFrom with its own domain, SPF might pass, but Identifier Alignment with the RFC5322.From header field will fail."
Either way SPF cannot give DMARC an aligned pass for forwarded mail. Google says the same for mail forwarded to Gmail: "Email forwarding can affect message authentication, and forwarded messages often fail SPF authentication." Adding the forwarder to your SPF record is not a fix: you do not know every forwarder your recipients use, and each one costs lookups.
Why DKIM usually survives
A DKIM signature covers the body and a list of header fields, not the delivering server. A message that is forwarded unchanged still verifies, with the original signing domain. That is why RFC 7960 concludes that "DKIM must be relied upon to produce results that are relevant to" the From domain, and why Google tells senders that "For forwarded messages, DKIM authentication is especially important".
DKIM fails when the forwarder changes what was signed. Google lists the changes that make forwarded messages fail DKIM, among them:
- "Modifying the MIME boundaries"
- "Modifying the message Subject"
- "Third-party software modifying the body of the message (including re-encoding the message)"
The receiver then reports that the body hash did not verify; DKIM body hash did not verify explains that error.
What it means for DMARC
DMARC passes when SPF or DKIM passes and is aligned with the From domain. For forwarded mail only DKIM can do that, so the rule for a sending domain is short: every service that sends with your domain in From must sign with DKIM under your domain, or with a subdomain of it, before you move to p=quarantine or p=reject. Mail that passes SPF but has no aligned DKIM signature is exactly the mail that disappears when it is forwarded. DMARC fails while SPF passes explains the alignment rule, and Microsoft's rejection of such mail is described in 550 5.7.509.
Do not expect the receiver to make an exception. RFC 9989 says receivers "SHOULD NOT reject messages solely because of a published policy of "reject"", but also that "In practice, despite this advice, few Mail Receivers apply any mitigation techniques when receiving indirect mail flows".
Mailing lists
A mailing list is a forwarder that changes the message: it adds a subject tag, a footer or unsubscribe headers. That breaks DKIM, so mail from a domain with p=reject would fail DMARC at every subscriber. RFC 9989 describes what list software does about it: "Some simply use the list's address, while others do per-address modifications intended to be reversible or to allow mail to be forwarded back to the original author, e.g., [email protected] turned into [email protected]."
Google Groups does this too. For a sender whose domain has p=quarantine or p=reject, Gmail shows "'Sender Name' via Group-Name" with the group's address as the sender. The "via" is about the list, not about your setup; Remove "via" and "on behalf of" covers the cases you can fix.
If you run a forwarder
Google's advice to administrators who forward mail to Gmail:
- "Change the envelope sender to reference your forwarding domain." This is envelope rewriting, often done with the Sender Rewriting Scheme (SRS). SPF then checks your domain instead of failing for the original one, and bounces come back to you.
- "Make sure your domain's SPF record includes the IP addresses or domains of all servers or services that forward email for your domain."
- Do not change the body or the signed headers, so the original DKIM signature still verifies.
- Add a forwarding header: "add an X-Forwarded-For: or X-Forwarded-To: message header."
- Filter spam before forwarding it. Google warns that "If forwarded messages from your domain are marked as spam by recipients, future messages from your domain are more likely to be marked as spam."
Envelope rewriting does not give the original domain an aligned SPF pass; RFC 7960 section 3.2 lists it among the things "The DMARC design does not cope with". The original sender's DKIM signature is still what carries DMARC.
ARC
The Authenticated Received Chain, RFC 8617, "provides an authenticated "chain of custody" for a message, allowing each entity that handles the message to see what entities handled it before and what the message's authentication assessment was at each step in the handling." A forwarder or list that supports ARC records that DKIM and DMARC passed when the message reached it, and the final receiver can choose to trust that record after the list has broken the signature.
ARC is an experimental RFC, and trust in a chain is each receiver's own decision. RFC 9989 mentions it as the main attempt to keep lists working without rewriting From, and adds: "as of this document's publication, none of the methods have become widely used." Plan for DKIM, not for ARC.
How to check it
Run the email security check on your domain to see SPF, DMARC and DKIM together. The DKIM selector finder shows which common selectors have keys, so you can see whether each sending service signs with your domain. To read what a receiver concluded for a forwarded message, look at its Authentication-Results header; Reading Authentication-Results explains the fields.
Frequently asked questions
Why does forwarded mail fail SPF?
The forwarding server delivers the message from its own IP address, and that address is not in the SPF record of the original sender's domain. If the forwarder keeps the original envelope sender, SPF fails. If it replaces the envelope sender with its own domain, SPF can pass, but that domain is not aligned with the From address (RFC 7960 section 2.2).
Will p=reject block my forwarded mail?
Only when DKIM fails too. A message that is forwarded unchanged keeps a valid DKIM signature, and an aligned DKIM pass is enough for DMARC. Mail that a mailing list changes, for example by adding a footer, loses the signature; RFC 9989 section 7.4 says such mail "is frequently rejected due to a "p=reject" policy" unless the list rewrites the From address.
Does ARC fix forwarding?
Not on its own. ARC (RFC 8617, experimental) lets each server that handles a message record the authentication results it saw, and the final receiver may use them. Whether it trusts them is its own decision, and RFC 9989 says none of the methods for this have become widely used.
Sources
- RFC 9989: Domain-Based Message Authentication, Reporting, and Conformance (DMARC), sections 5.4 and 7.4, RFC Editor, fetched 2026-11-16.
- RFC 7960: Interoperability Issues between DMARC and Indirect Email Flows, sections 2.2 and 3.2, RFC Editor, fetched 2026-11-16.
- RFC 8617: The Authenticated Received Chain (ARC) Protocol, RFC Editor, fetched 2026-11-16.
- Best practices for forwarding email to Gmail, Gmail Help, fetched 2026-11-16.
- Extra info next to sender's name, Gmail Help, fetched 2026-11-16.